Editor:
The headline in the Oct. 23 issue of the Outlook reads Cougar Creek home buyout would cost $91 million.
Is that really an option or just another example of effective use of a straw man strategy to get a preferred result?
Let’s have a look at the facts. The facts are that there are no existing or planned programs, at any level of government, for which any of the homes on Cougar Creek are eligible for a buyout. There are also no current official definitions of future risk of flooding that would apply to any homes on or near Cougar Creek.
There would be zero funds available to undertake such a buyout, unless it was fully funded by the Town of Canmore – a fiscal impossibility. So why put this option forward at all?
One way of looking at this is that it demonstrates some level of fiscal prudence by administrators and town council when the preferred option for flood mitigation would cost less than half of that. Another is that it acknowledges and dismisses revisionist history proposals that would wish away any development on Cougar Creek without any consideration of the cost. It also tells those homeowners on Cougar Creek whose preferred option is a buyout that it was considered but that it would be politically irresponsible to do so. That it addresses all three makes it a really effective straw man.
So what is really at work here? A lot of money has already been spent on flood risk mitigation on Cougar Creek. The reshaping of the creek, the new armouring of the banks and the debris net were all largely untested by this spring’s non-event.
The risk factors that were in place for this spring have not changed, nor have the mitigations put in place. What has changed is that there is more information available. The extensive work done by BGC Engineering in consultation with town administration provides the best information available and may well represent some breakthrough analyses of Cougar Creek debris flood risks and consequent risks to property and life.
The question still remains though, why the rush to implement the preferred solution of a permanent $40 million flood retention structure? There are many unanswered questions.
One of the key questions is who is going to pay for this? We are told in the presentation material that 90 per cent of the funding is expected to be paid for by various sources of provincial government funding with the remaining 10 per cent to be paid by the taxpayers of the town of Canmore.
We are also told that the model being followed is one in place in Austria, where the municipality pays for 10 per cent of such costs. Austria? Really?
What about what is happening in the rest of the province of Alberta? How much of the proposed Springbank dry dam project is the city of Calgary volunteering to pay for because that’s how they do it in Austria? How much of the river diversion project at High River is being voluntarily contributed by the town of High River because that’s how these projects are funded in Austria? Has council really considered the consequences of volunteering to pay for 10 per cent of flood mitigation projects?
Flood mitigation costs related to other mountain creeks such as Pigeon, Three Sisters, Stone, Stoneworks and others are still unknown. The $4 million contribution for Cougar Creek flood mitigation that Canmore council seems to be committing to may only be the tip of a much larger iceberg.
Town council seems to be fully committed to spending $40 million on Cougar Creek. This is borne out by its direction to administration to look at ways the daycare lands can be used to raise $4 million in capital to be applied to funding the town’s contribution.
Or is flood mitigation being used as a blunt instrument to force opponents of development of the daycare lands to be reasonable, placing them in the awkward position of being opposed to protecting their friends and neighbours from future flooding in addition to being concerned about what kind of development, if any, takes place on those lands?
Another key question is what public policy decisions need to be made prior to proceeding with the Cougar Creek flood retention structure? A core responsibility of public policy decision makers is to take the best information available, consider recommendations put forward by experts, and then make decisions.
It is not appropriate for them to side-step this responsibility by accepting, without question, such information and recommendations. The BGC study concludes that the most appropriate debris flood risk to base its mitigation plans on is a 1,000-3,000 year return period. How does that align with public policy decisions at other levels of government?
If provincial government funding is premised on a much different, shorter return period, is Canmore prepared to make up the difference in mitigation costs? The BGC report also recommends a specific risk tolerance equation. The report itself indicates that the acceptable risk tolerance level must be established at the policy level and that their report simply reflects practices that are in place in some geographies elsewhere, just not in Alberta.
Council has not addressed either of these policy issues and instead has abdicated its responsibility to one expert opinion. These are much more important considerations to address than where to find $4 million, which may or may not be an appropriate or sufficient expenditure to which to commit local taxpayers.
That brings us to the question: what is the urgency? Is the risk of catastrophic debris floods on Cougar Creek any higher next spring than last spring? Are we any less prepared now than we were in May/June 2014? Are immediate decisions/actions required that would change that risk profile? I submit that the answers to these questions is no and that there is no greater urgency to proceed with a permanent flood mitigation project on Cougar Creek today than there was at any time since the flood of 2013.
Council’s time and attention would be better spent addressing these and other key questions prior to making decisions on permanent flood mitigation, rather than managing public perceptions and opinion.
To do otherwise will likely result in the application of the law of unintended consequences. While those unintended consequences for members of council may only be that in future they will be seen to have made poor or incomplete decisions, for taxpayers they invariably turn into inadequate solutions and higher taxes, which have a way of staying with us forever.
Hans Helder,
Canmore
